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The government’s pledge to raise the share of revenue from
green taxes has always been problematic
One little discussed aspect of the Autumn Statement has been the ambiguous state in which it has left the
commitment to environmental taxes made in the coalition agreement. Andrew Leicester and George
Stoye explore the current status of this pledge, going on to argue that it is indicative of an ineffective and
problematic approach to taxation. 
Ideally, taxes (including green taxes) should be raised in the most ef f ective way, rather than to hit some
essentially arbitrary target f or receipts f rom one part of  the system.
Amidst all the discussion of  the Chancellor ’s f iscal rules f ollowing the Autumn Statement, rather less
attention has been paid to another tax-related target. The Coalit ion Agreement set out a commitment to
“increase the proportion of  tax revenue accounted f or by environmental taxes.” The Environmental Audit
Committee reported last month that whether or not this pledge is met depends on how ‘environmental
taxes’ are def ined. This article looks at the status of  this pledge af ter the Autumn Statement, and asks
whether such a target is sensible in the f irst place.
The Treasury f inally clarif ied its interpretation of  the pledge in July:
environmental taxes should make up at least as big a part of  total revenue in 2015/16 as in
2010/11;
only taxes whose primary objective is to encourage pro-environmental behaviour change (rather
than, say, revenue-raising) count as ‘environmental’.
International bodies such as the OECD and Eurostat, however, def ine environmental taxes not according
to their intent, but on whether the tax encourages pro-environmental outcomes. On this basis, the
ONS classif ies taxes such as f uel duty and air passenger duty as environmental, which the Treasury
does not.
The table summarises Treasury and ONS def init ion of  environmental taxes. We also suggest a third
def init ion, which perhaps best ref lects all those taxes which are environmental either in terms of  intent or
outcome, and f or which we have revenue f orecasts to 2015/16. This includes company car taxes which,
like vehicle excise duty, depend on the f uel ef f iciency of  the car. However, in line with international
practice, it excludes VAT on f uel duty since VAT is a general consumption tax rather than a particular
environmental tax. As shown at the f oot of  the table, we f ind that the def init ion of  green taxes does
indeed af f ect whether or not the target is met.
Three definit ions of ‘environmental taxes’, and compliance with target
On the Treasury
No te : Fig ure s fo r 2010/11 are  o ut-turns and  2015/16 are  fo re casts. Re ve nue s are  take n fro m the  OBR
Eco no mic and  Fiscal Outlo o k, co nsiste nt with the  De ce mb e r 2012 Autumn State me nt. The  e xce p tio n is
co mp any car taxe s, whe re  fo re casts are  take n fro m a writte n ministe rial s tate me nt to  the  Ho use  o f
Co mmo ns o n 16 July b y Eco no mic Se cre tary to  the  Tre asury, Chlo e  Smith.
On the Treasury
def init ion, the
government would
easily meet its
pledge: the green tax
share is set to more
than double, f rom
0.4% to 0.9% of
revenues. Green
taxes in 2015/16
could f all by £3.2
billion (56% of
f orecast
environmental
receipts that year)
bef ore the target is
missed.
On the ONS
def init ion, however, the green tax share will f all f rom 7.8% to 7.0% of  revenues, breaching the target.
Revenues f rom this set of  taxes would have to rise by £5.3 billion (11%) in 2015/16 to meet the target.
On our def init ion, the pledge is also missed, with the green tax share f alling f rom 7.3% to 7.0%. Green
taxes would need to rise by £2.3 billion (5%) to hit the target.
Why do the results dif f er? Total green taxes are substantially lower on the Treasury def init ion, mainly
because it excludes f uel duties which are estimated to raise £27.8 billion in 2015/16. Including f uel duties
makes the pledge much harder to meet: their share of  total revenues is set to f all by 0.8 percentage
points by 2015/16.
Excluding f uel duties also allows the Chancellor to make f urther concessions on duties in f uture years
without jeopardising the target. Indeed, if  f uel duty is not considered an environmental tax, it actually
makes the target easier to meet by reducing total ‘non-environmental’ revenues. The Autumn Statement
announced that the planned duty rise f or January 2012 was to be cancelled, and f uture planned inf lation
adjustments in duties were pushed back by f ive months f rom April to September each year. Together
these ref orms cost around £1.7 billion in 2015/16, the year in which compliance with the green tax target
is to be judged. This is almost the entire amount by which, on our def init ion, the pledge would be
breached.
It may well be reasonable to take dif f erent views on the precise def init ion of  what constitutes a green
tax. More f undamentally, we should ask whether the pledge to raise their importance in total revenues
has any particular merit, setting aside the def init ional issues. Ideally, taxes (including green taxes) should
be raised in the most ef f ective way, rather than to hit some essentially arbitrary target f or receipts f rom
one part of  the system. Whether environmental taxes make up a bit more or a bit less of  total revenues
in 2015/16 than they did in 2010/11 is not of  much real consequence. Moreover, the green tax share of
revenues is not really a good indicator of  a government’s environmental credentials. The tax system can
be ‘greened’ without raising more money: ref orms to vehicle excise duty to base payments on f uel
ef f iciency are one example. Other environmental policies such as regulation and subsidies operate
outside the tax system but could still have important environmental benef its. Some green tax revenues
may erode away as people change their behaviour in response to the tax. The green tax share also
depends on total revenues which can be very sensit ive to overall macroeconomic conditions.
It took the government more than two years to lay out the rules against which it wished its green tax
target to be judged. In the end, its chosen def init ion makes the pledge easy to accomplish but implies a
very limited role f or green taxes. If  they really do make up less than 1% of  total receipts, then any
ambition to move towards a signif icant role f or such taxes in the f uture (such as that adopted by
the Liberal Democrats at their 2010 conf erence) appears to be a very long way away.
More f undamentally, pledging to meet certain targets which are then def ined in such a way as to make
them trivial both to meet and in their apparent importance does not look like an ef f ective way of  gaining
credibility. A green tax def init ion more in line with international convention would be much more
constraining and require the government to take policy action. As a result, there will almost certainly be
an argument at the next election as to whether or not the pledge was met. A better argument would be
that it wasn’t really worth making in the f irst place.
This art icle f irst appeared on the IFS website.
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You may also be interested in the following posts (automatically generated):
1. ‘Green Growth’ is an attractive concept f or analysts and policy makers alike, but to be ef f ective it
must be backed up by ef f ective collective action, not spin. (18.2)
2. If  implemented properly, the government’s planned ref orm of  the UK energy sector should make it
easier f or carbon reduction targets to be met (11.6)
3. The UK government should stick to a plan of  aggressive de-carbonisation and avoid the
temptation of  a new dash f or gas (10.1)
4. Government investment needs to be rebalanced to promote growth in neglected regions outside
the Greater South East (8.8)
